

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

BIB-01 /088 W

----- 073200

R 071930Z FEB 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9998

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDELM MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 0684

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: AIR MANPOWER SPC DISCUSSION FEBRUARY 6

REF: USNATO 0580

SUMMARY: SPC ON FEBRUARY 6 CONSIDERED U.S. PROPOSAL ON AIR MANPOWER. NETHERLANDS REP MADE A FURTHER STATEMENT OF DUTCH SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. PROPOSAL. HE NOTED DUTCH INTEREST IN AN EARLY STUDY OF OPTION III, BUT SAID NETHERLANDS BELIEVES ALLIES CAN CONSIDER AIR MANPOWER SEPARATELY FROM OPTION III. UK REP, ON INSTRUCTIONS, STATED WHY THE UK STILL HAS NO POSITION ON THE U.S. PROPOSAL. UK IS STUDYING IT AND STILL HAS AN OPEN MIND. UK IS CONSIDERING BOTH ITS TECHNICAL EFFECTS, AND ITS NEGOTIATING USE IN VIENNA, I.E. WHAT WOULD BE THE RIGHT TIME TO INTRODUCE IT IN THE NEGOTIATION, AND HOW TO GET MAXIMUM VALUE FROM IT. END SUMMARY

1. NETHERLANDS REP (MEESMAN) MADE A FURTHER STATEMENT OF DUTCH SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. PROPOSAL. THE TEXT OF HIS STATEMENT
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IS AS FOLLOWS.

BEGIN TEXT

1. COMPARED WITH THE EARLIER US PROPOSAL TO BRING AIR FORCE MANPOWER UNDER THE COMMON CEILING, THIS LATEST PROPOSAL SEEMS TO HAVE CERTAIN ADVANTAGES:

-IN VIEW OF THE EASTERN INTEREST IN REDUCTION OF AIR FORCES IT ADVANCES OUR REDUCTION PROPOSAL FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW;

-THIS PROPOSAL AVERTS A POSSIBLE LENGTHY DISCUSSION ON THE ISSUE OF REDEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES;

- AT THE SAME TIME WE CONTINUE TO INSIST ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY. THEREFORE THE TALKS REMAIN FOCUSED ON THE REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES.

2. IT IS WITH THIS FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES IN MIND THAT WE HAVE EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE FOR THOSE OPTIONS IN THE WORKING GROUP'S REPORT ON SERVICE SUBCEILINGS (AC/276-D(74)12 AND 14) IN WHICH A GROUND FORCE SUBCEILING IS MENTIONED.

IT HAS BEEN SAID, THAT THIS PREFERENCE FOR A SUBCEILING ON GROUND FORCES WOULD SEEM TO CLASH WITH THE FACT THAT IN OUR OPINION THE US PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE THAT THE REDEFINITION ISSUE WOULD BECOME LESS IMPORTANT. WE THINK, HOWEVER, THAT THERE ARE REASONS WHY A SUBCEILING ON GROUND FORCES MIGHT STILL BE USEFUL:

-ACCORDING TO THE US PROPOSAL 15 PCT OF THE TOTAL GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER TO BE REDUCED SHOULD BE IN US AND US GROUND FORCES. THEREFORE, ONE WOULD STILL WANT TO KNOW WHICH TROOPS ARE GROUND FORCES.

-PHASE 2 REDUCTIONS WILL CONCENTRATE ON GROUND FORCES. SO HERE AGAIN WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE AN IDEA AS TO WHETHER TROOPS ARE GROUND FORCES OR NOT.

-A SUBCEILING ON GROUND FORCES WOULD HAVE THE ADDED ADVANTAGE THAT IN A POST REDUCTION PERIOD THE OTHER SIDE CANNOT
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INCREASE ITS GROUND FORCES BY WITHDRAWING AIR FORCES FROM THE AREA.

THIS PREVENTS THE POSSIBILITY OF A BUILD-UP OF GROUND FORCES IN THE AREAS AT THE EXPENSE OF AIR FORCES. THE OTHER SIDE MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO DO SO, AS AIR FORCES CAN BE BROUGHT BACK INTO THE AREA MUCH MORE RAPIDLY.

3. ON THE OTHER HAND ELEMENTS OF THE US PROPOSAL WILL SURELY NOT BE TO THE LIKING OF THE OTHER SIDE:

- IT HAS A SUPERIORITY IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF APPROXIMATELY 12.000 MEN. THESE MEN WOULD NOW COME TO FALL UNDER

THE COMMON CEILING.

-THE 30 TO 40.000 POLISH AND CZECH TERRITORIAL AIR DEFENCE PERSONNEL WHICH THE WEST WOULD BE PREPARED TO LABEL AIR FORCE PERSONNEL FOR THE SAKE OF MBFR WOULD EQUALLY BE INCLUDED IN THE COMMON CEILING.

4. HOWEVER, THE WP HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY ARE INTERESTED IN AIR FORCE REDUCTIONS. THIS PROPOSAL GIVES THEM AN INDICATION THAT REDUCTIONS IN THIS FIELD ARE NOT TO BE RULED OUT. THIS CONFRONTS THEM WITH A CHOICE, EITHER THEY INSIST ON AIR FORCE REDUCTIONS AND FORGO THE ADVANTAGES OF REDEFINITION, OR NOT.

5. IT HAS BEEN ARGUED THAT THE US PROPOSAL MIGHT SET A PRECEDENT FOR AIR FORCE REDUCTIONS IN PHASE 2.

IF ONE LOOKS AT THE FIGURES, HOWEVER, IT WOULD SEEM THAT AIR FORCES ARE HARDLY GOING TO BE AFFECTED.

THE US SAY THAT AIR FORCE REDUCTIONS IN PHASE 2 ARE OPTIONALLY. THIS MEANS THAT IT WILL REMAIN POSSIBLE FOR THOSE WHO DO NOT WANT TO REDUCE AIR FORCE PERSONNEL TO REDUCE GROUND FORCES ONLY.

OUR AIM IS A COMBINED COMMON CEILING OF 900.000 MEN. THE FIGURE FOR TOTAL ALLIED GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA STANDS AT 986.000 MEN. CONSEQUENTLY, DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WILL HAVE TO REDUCE 86.000 MEN.

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IN PHASE 1, US REDUCTIONS AMOUNT TO 34.050 MEN (SITCEN 3103). REMAIN TO BE REDUCED IN PHASE 2, 51.950 MEN.

THE US HAVE INDICATED THAT THEIR PHASE 1 REDUCTIONS WILL CONTAIN AN AIR FORCE ELEMENT. LET US SUPPOSE THAT THE AIR FORCE COMPENENT OF US PHASE 1 REDUCTIONS WILL BE 15 PCT, THEN THE US WILL REDUCE 5.100 AIR FORCE PERSONNEL AND 28.950 GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL. ACCORDING TO CM-(73)-83 PARA 12, THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WILL REDUCE NO MORE THAN 10 PCT OF THEIR GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OR 79.000 MEN. IF WE ASSUME THAT IN PHASE 2 WE SHALL WANT TO CONFINE OURSELVES TO REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES ONLY, THEN WE SHALL HAVE TO REDUCE 51.950 PLUS 28.950 EQUALS 80.900 MEN.

BUT, TOTAL ALLIED GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS ARE NOT TO EXCEED 79.000 MEN.

THERE REMAINS THEREFORE A FIGURE OF ONLY 1.900 MEN WHICH CANNOT BE REDUCED FROM GROUND FORCES.

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6. WE THINK THAT THE SPC SHOULD DIRECT ITS ATTENTION TO THE LATEST US PROPOSAL. THE US PAPER ADVANCES OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION, AND CONSEQUENTLY IT ENABLES THE AD HOC GROEP TO CONTINUE TO PROBE THE OTHER SIDE EVEN FURTHER.

IF, HOWEVER, THE WP SHOULD FAIL TO RESPOND TO THIS MOVE, WE DO NOT SEEM TO HAVE GIVEN AWAY VERY MUCH.

7. IF THE SOVIETS EVER INTIMATED THAT THERE WAS A LINK WITH CSCE, THIS WAS DONE IN THE CONTEXT OF CCSCE SO AS TO URGE US TO MOVE MORE RAPIDLY IN GENEVA.

WE THINK THAT THIS SHOULD NOT DETER US IN MBFR AND THAT, IRRESPECTIVE OF CSCE, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PROBE THE OTHER SIDE IN VIENNA, AT THE SAME TIME WORKING OUT OUR POSITION IN MORE DETAIL.

8. ON AN EARLIER OCCASION THE BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT ONE
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COULD NOT HAVE A MEANINGFUL DISCUSSION OF THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL IF ONE DID NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF INTRODUCING A NUCLEAR ELEMENT INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS.

DELEGATIONS WILL REMEMBER THAT THE NETHERLANDS PROPOSED, THAT A STUDY OF A POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION OF A NUCLEAR ELEMENT INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS BE UNDERTAKEN WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AS SOON AS

POSSIBLE. ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUE TO THINK THAT STUDY ON THIS SUBJECT SHOULD START AT AN EARLY DATE, WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT THE PRESENT US PROPOSAL COULD BE CONSIDERED SEPARATELY.

THE SO-CALLED THIRD OPTION IS ABOUT ARMS NOT PERSONNEL, THE US PROPOSAL ABOUT MEN AND NOT ARMS. THE US IN THEIR PAPER OF 2 DECEMBER, 1974, STATE THAT REDUCTIONS OF UP TO 15 PCT IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER WILL NOT RESULT IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF AIRCRAFT.

AS AIRCRAFT WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THIS PROPOSAL, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHY THERE SHOULD BE A LINK WITH THE THIRD OPTION.

END TEXT

2. CANADIAN REP (BARTLEMAN), WITH RESPECT TO DUTCH REP'S REMARK ON CSCE-MBFR LINKAGE, NOTED THAT CANADIAN REP'S REMARKS ON THIS SUBJECT AT THE PRECEDING MEETING WERE MADE ON A PERSONAL BASIS, WITHOUT ANY INTENTION OF IMPLYING THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD DELAY AN OFFER ON AIR MANPOWER.

3. FRG REP (DZIALAS) SAID THAT THE DUTCH MATHEMATICS WERE NOT RELEVANT TO THE PRECEDENT ISSUE. HE NOTED FRG CONCERN THAT U.S. AND SOVIET AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I WOULD CREATE A PRECEDENT FOR AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS BY OTHER ALLIES IN PHASE II, AND THAT THE 15 PERCENT FIGURE IN THE U.S. PROPOSAL WOULD CREATE A PRECEDENT AS WELL.

4. UK REP (BAILES) SAID THAT SHE HAD INSTRUCTIONS ON WHY THE UK HAS STILL TAKEN NO POSITION ON THE U.S. PROPOSAL. THE UK IS STUDYING THE PROPOSAL AND STILL HAS AN OPEN MIND. THE U.S. PROPOSAL WOULD REPRESENT AN IMPORTANT CHANGE IN THE ALLIED POSITION. THE UK IS CONSIDERING ITS TECHNICAL EFFECTS, AND ITS NEGOTIATING USE IN VIENNA, I.E. WHAT WOULD BE THE RIGHT TIME
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TO INTRODUCE IT IN THE NEGOTIATION, AND HOW TO GET MAXIMUM VALUE FROM IT.

5. U.S. REP (MOORE) REVIEWED THE U.S. REASONS WHY THE U.S. PROPOSAL WOULD NOT CREATE ANY PRECEDENT FOR PHASE II OTHER THAN VOLUNTARY AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS.

6. COMMENT: THE UK STATEMENT SINGLED OUT TIMING OF INTRODUCTION OF AIR MANPOWER AS AN ISSUE UNDER STUDY IN LONDON. THIS UNDERLINES THE NEED FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. VIEWS ON THE ISSUE OF TIMING, WHICH THE MISSION PREVIOUSLY NOTED IN PARA 7, REFTEL, BOTH IN CONNECTION WITH AIR MANPOWER, AND WITH OTHER IMPORTANT OFFERS THE ALLIES MAY EVENTUALLY WISH TO MAKE, E.G. OPTION III.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 18 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 07 FEB 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975NATO00684
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750286/abbrzibu.tel
Line Count: 272
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: USNATO 0580
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 31 MAR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <31 MAR 2003 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <02 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: AIR MANPOWER SPC DISCUSSION FEBRUARY 6
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO BONN
LONDON
MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

Type: TE

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006